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Abstract: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems exploit the laws of quantum mechanics to
generate secure keying material for cryptographic purposes. To date, several commercially viable
decoy state enabled QKD systems have been successfully demonstrated and show promise for
high-security applications such as banking, government, and military environments. In this work,
a detailed performance analysis of decoy state enabled QKD systems is conducted through model
and simulation of several common decoy state configurations. The results of this study uniquely
demonstrate that the decoy state protocol can ensure Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks are
detected with high confidence, while maximizing the system’s quantum throughput at no additional
cost. Additionally, implementation security guidance is provided for QKD system developers and users.
Keywords: quantum key distribution; decoy state protocol; photon number splitting attack;
implementation security
1. Introduction
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a revolutionary security protocol which generates unlimited
amounts of symmetric keying material between two geographically separated parties. Unlike
conventional key distribution techniques, the security of QKD rests on the laws of quantum
mechanics and not on computational complexity [1]. In theory, these attributes make QKD well
suited for high-security applications such as banking, government, and military environments.
However, implementation non-idealities and practical engineering limitations in commercially viable
QKD systems (i.e., those which balance cost, performance, and security towards affordability) can
negatively impact system performance and security [2]. For example, while commercial QKD systems
often employ the decoy state protocol to mitigate vulnerabilities in non-ideal photon sources [3,4],
its implementation security is poorly understood. Note, the decoy state protocol is well studied with
respect to secure key rate generation (see background for details).
This work uniquely studies the decoy state protocol’s implementation security in commercially
viable QKD systems by modeling, simulating, and analyzing decoy state protocol configurations.
The results of this study: (i) demonstrate the effectiveness of the several common decoy state enabled
QKD system configurations to detect Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attacks; (ii) optimize the decoy
state protocol to maximum quantum throughput; (iii) offer implementation security recommendations
for QKD system designers and users; and (iv) present a repeatable methodology for analyzing the
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performance and security of QKD systems. This article is an extension of the Author’s previous
works [5–9].
This article is organized as follows: First, an introduction to QKD is provided with an emphasis
on security vulnerabilities, the PNS attack, and the decoy state protocol. Note, Section 2 is intended for
those unfamiliar with QKD and the decoy state protocol. If the reader is familiar with these protocols,
they should proceed directly to the next Section. In Section 3, the research method is explained,
including a comprehensive listing of fielded decoy state enabled QKD systems, the Researcher’s
experimental design, and the QKD system-level model. Section 4 details the decoy state protocol’s
ability to detect PNS attacks across 40 common decoy state protocol configurations. Next, an
optimization of the protocol is presented and demonstrated through model and simulation. Lastly,
several implementation security recommendations are offered. Section 5 presents conclusions and
future work. For security specialists desiring to further understand QKD, please see [5,10,11].
For comprehensive physics-based reviews of QKD, please see [1,4].
2. Quantum Key Distribution
The genesis of QKD traces back to the late 1960s, when Wiesner first proposed the idea of
encoding information on polarized photons using two conjugate bases [12]. In 1984, Bennett and
Brassard extended this idea by introducing the first QKD protocol, known as “BB84”, to generate shared
secret keying material between two parties [13]. Today, QKD is gaining attention as an important
development in the cybersecurity solution space because of its ability to generate unlimited amounts
of symmetric keying material for use with the One-Time-Pad (OTP)—the only known encryption
algorithm to achieve perfect secrecy [14,15]. In this way, QKD enables unbreakable communications
and has inspired research efforts across Asia, Europe, and North America [16]. While there are many
competing QKD protocols, BB84 is primarily considered in this work because it remains a popular
implementation choice and is relatively easy to understand [1].
2.1. The BB84 QKD Protocol
Figure 1 illustrates a notional QKD system configured to securely generate the secure shared key
K, which is used to encrypt/decrypt sensitive data, voice, or video communications. The QKD system
consists of a sender “Alice”, a receiver “Bob”, a quantum channel (i.e., an optical fiber or direct line
of sight free space path), and a classical channel (i.e., a conventional networked connection). Alice
is shown with a laser source configured to generate and prepare single photons, known as quantum
bits or “qubits”. The encoded photons are then transmitted over the quantum channel to Bob, whom
measures them using specialized single photon detectors. This exchange of encoded single photons is
described by the BB84 protocol.
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Figure 1. This is a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system context diagram. The sender “Alice” and 
receiver “Bob” generate shared secret key 𝐾 for use in data encryption/decryption. Reproduced with 
permission from [9], Copyright IEEE, 2016. 
Table 1 describes the BB84 protocol as a prepare and measure protocol where Alice encodes 
photons in one of four polarization states (e.g., ↔, ↕, ⤢, or ⤡) according to a randomly selected bit 
K for use in data encryption/
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Table 1 describes the BB84 protocol as a prepare and measure protocol where Alice encodes
photons in one of four polarization states (e.g., ↔, l ,
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value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair ↔, ↕ or ⊗ for the pair ⤢,⤡). Once Alice randomly prepares 
the photons, they are sent to Bob where he measures each photon using a randomly selected basis 
(⊕  or ⊗). If Alice’s encoding and Bob’s decoding bases match, the photon’s bit value is read 
correctly with a high probability. Otherwise, a random result occurs (i.e., equal likelihood of a 0  
or 1); this is due to the inherent uncertainty in the measurement of an unknown (i.e., a randomly 
encoded) single photon. Typically, these random results are “sifted” from Bob’s recorded detections 
and do not contribute to the shared key string. 
Table 1. Example BB84 Protocol. 
Alice Prepares Bob Measures
Bit Basis Prepared State Basis Result
0 ⊕ |↔ ⊕ 0 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊕ 1 
0 ⊕ |↔  ⊗ random 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊗ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢  ⊕ random 
1 ⊗ |⤡ ⊕ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢ ⊗ 0 
1 ⊗ |⤡  ⊗ 1 
More specifically, the security of BB84 is based on the uncertainty principle where the 
measurement result is random when using two conjugate bases (i.e., ⊕ or ⊗) to prepare single 
photons [17]. For example, during an intercept-resend attack anyone attempting to listen on the 
quantum channel must randomly select a measurement basis and will necessarily introduce 
detectable errors. These unavoidable errors increase the protocol’s measured Quantum Bit Error Rate 
(QBER)—the ratio (or percent) of errors detected with respect to the total number of matched pulse 
detections—and if the QBER ever exceeds the protocol’s security threshold (e.g., QBER > 11% [4]), 
the secret key distribution process is aborted (or restarted) as it is assumed an eavesdropper is active 
on the quantum channel. This is because all errors on the quantum channel are attributed to 
adversarial interference. 
2.2. Vulnerabilities in Protocol Implementation 
BB84 security proofs assume several idealities, including perfect on-demand single photon 
sources, lossless quantum transmission, perfect transmitter-receiver basis alignment, and perfect 
single photon detection [18]. However, these security assumptions are not valid when building  
real-world systems which deviate from theoretical protocols [2]. For example, reliable on-demand 
single photon sources are not currently available nor are they expected in the near term [1]. Therefore, 
most QKD systems attenuate classical laser pulses down from millions of photons to weak coherent 
pulses with an average photon number less than one. More specifically, the number of photons 
contained in the pulse is represented using a Poisson distribution with a low (i.e., <1) Mean Photon 
Number (MPN) | = ! , (1)
where  is the average number of photons in a pulse (i.e.,  is the MPN) and  represents the 
number of photons in the pulse (i.e., = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , N). For example, with a typical MPN, = 0.5, 
nearly 60% of the pulses have zero photons, 30% of the pulses have one photon, and 9% of the pulses 
have two or more photons. This means nearly 23% of the non-empty pulses emitted by Alice are  
non-ideal multiphoton pulses which leak information about the “unconditionally secure”  
QKD-generated secret key to eavesdroppers. This introduces a significant security vulnerability into 
the QKD protocol. 
2.3. Photon Number Splitting (PNS) Attacks 
or
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value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair ↔, ↕ or ⊗ for the pair ⤢,⤡). Once Alice randomly prepares 
the photo s, they are sent to Bob where he measures each photon using a ra l  selected basis 
(⊕  or ⊗). If Alice’s enc ding and Bob’s decoding bases match, the ph ton’s bit value is read 
correctly with a high probability. Otherwise, a random result occurs (i.e., equal likelihood of a 0  
or 1); this is due to the inherent uncertainty i  the measurement of an unknown (i.e., a randomly 
encoded) single photon. Typically, these rando  res lts are “sifted” from Bob’s recorded detections 
an  do not contribute to the shared key string. 
Table 1. Example BB84 Protocol. 
Alice Prepares Bob Measures
Bit Basis Prepared State Basis Result
0 ⊕ |↔ ⊕ 0 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊕ 1 
0 ⊕ |↔  ⊗ random 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊗ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢  ⊕ random 
1 ⊗ |⤡ ⊕ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢ ⊗ 0 
1 ⊗ |⤡  ⊗ 1 
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quantum channel must ra domly select a measurement basis and will necessarily introduce 
detectable errors. These unavoidable errors increase the protocol’s measured Quantum Bit Error Rate 
(QBER)—the ratio (or percent) of errors detected with respect to the total number of matched pulse 
detections—and if the QBER ever exceeds the protocol’s security threshold (e.g., QBER > 11% [4]), 
the secret key distribution process is aborted (or restarted) as it is assumed an eavesdropper is active 
on the quantum channel. This is because all errors on the quantum channel are attributed to 
adversarial interference. 
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value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair ↔, ↕ r ⊗ for the pair ⤢,⤡). Once Alic  randomly prepares 
the photons, t y are sent to  where he measures eac  photon usi g a randomly selected basis 
(⊕  or ⊗). If Alice’s encoding and Bob’s ecoding bases match, the photon’s bit value is read 
correctly wit  a high probability. Otherwise, a random result occurs (i.e., equ l likelihood of a 0  
or 1); this is due to the in er nt u certainty in th  measurement of an unknown (i. ., a randomly 
encoded) single p oton. Typically, these random results are “sifted” from Bob’s recorded detections 
and do not contribute to the shared key string. 
Table 1. Example BB84 Protocol. 
Alice Prep r s Bob Measures
Bit Basis Prepared State Basis Result
0 ⊕ |↔ ⊕ 0 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊕ 1 
0 ⊕ |↔  ⊗ random 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊗ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢  ⊕ random 
1 ⊗ |⤡ ⊕ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢ ⊗ 0 
1 ⊗ |⤡  ⊗ 1 
More specifically, the security of BB84 is based on the uncertainty principle where the 
measurem nt result is ando  when using two conjugate bases (i.e., ⊕ or ⊗) to prepare single 
photo s [17]. For example, during n intercept-resend att ck anyone attempting to listen on the 
quantum c annel must randomly select a measurement basis and will necessarily introduce 
detectable errors. These una idable errors increase the protoc l’s measured Qu ntum Bit Error Rate 
(QBER)—the ratio (or perc nt) of errors e e ted with respect to the tot l number f matched pulse 
det ctions—and if the QBER ever exceeds he protocol’  security thr s old (e.g., QBER > 11% [4]), 
the secret key distribut on process is borted (or res arted) s it is assum d n e vesdropper is active 
on the quantum channel. This is because all errors on the quantum channel are attributed to 
adversarial interference. 
2.2. Vulnerabilities in Protocol Implementation 
BB84 security proofs a sume several ideal i s, including perfect n-demand single photon 
sources, lossless quantum transmission, pe fect transmitter-rec iver b s s alignment, a d perfect 
single photon detectio  [18]. Howe r, these se urity assumptions are not valid whe  building  
real-world systems which devi te from theoretical prot ols [2]. For example, reliabl  n-demand 
single p oton sources are n t curr ntly available nor are they expected in the near term [1]. Therefore, 
most QKD syst ms a tenuate classical laser pulses own from millions f photons to weak c herent 
pulses with an av rage photon umber less than one. More specifically, the number of photons 
contained in the pulse is represented using a Poisson distribution with a low (i.e., <1) Mean Photon 
Number (MPN) | = ! , (1)
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value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair ↔, ↕ or ⊗ for t e pair ⤢,⤡). Once Alice randomly prepares 
the photons, they are se t to Bob where he measures each photon using a randomly selecte  basis 
(⊕ or ⊗). If Alice’s e coding and Bob’s dec ding bases match, th  phot n’s bit value is read 
correctly wi h a hig  probability. Otherwise, a r nd  result occ rs (i.e., equal likelih od of a 0  
or 1); this is due to the inherent uncertainty in the easureme t of a  unkn wn (i.e., a ra domly 
e c ded) si gle photo . Typicall , these random results are “sifted” from B b’s recorded detections 
an  o not c ntribute to the shared key string. 
Table 1. Example BB84 Protocol. 
Alice Pr pares Bob Measures
Bit Basis Prepared State Basis Result
0 ⊕ |↔ ⊕ 0 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊕ 1 
0 ⊕ |↔  ⊗ random 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊗ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢  ⊕ random 
1 ⊗ |⤡ ⊕ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢ ⊗ 0 
1 ⊗ |⤡  ⊗ 1 
More specific lly, the s curity of BB84 is based on the unce tainty principl  where the 
measurement result is random when usi g two conjugate bases (i.e., ⊕ or ⊗) to prepare single 
photons [17]. For example, during an intercept-resend ttack anyone attempti g to listen on the 
qua tum chann l ust r ndomly select a m asureme t basis and will ecessa ily introduce 
detectable errors. These u av idable errors increas  th  pr tocol’s measured Quantum Bit Error Rate 
(QBER)—the ratio (or perc nt) of rrors detected with respec  to t e total n mber of matched pulse 
detections—and if the QBER ever exceeds the protocol’s security threshold (e.g., QBER > 11% [4]), 
the secret key distribution pr cess is aborted (  restarted) as it is assume  an eavesdropper is active 
o  the qua tum cha nel. This is because all errors o  the qua tum channel are attributed to 
adversarial interfere ce. 
2.2. Vulnerabilities in Protocol Implementation 
BB84 securi y proofs assume several idealities, including perfect o -d mand single photon 
sources, lossless quantum transmission, p rfec  tr smitter-receiver basis alignme t, and perfect 
single phot  detecti n [18]. However, hese security assumptions ar  not valid when building  
real-world systems whi h deviate from the etical protocols [2]. For ex mple, reliable on-d mand 
si gle photon sources are not currently available nor are they expected in he near t rm [1]. Therefore, 
mos  QKD systems attenuate classical laser pulses down from millions of photons t  weak coherent 
pulses with an ave age photon number le  than o e. More specifically, the number of photons 
contained i  the ulse is represented using a Poisson distribution with a low (i.e., <1) Mean Photon 
Number (MPN) | = ! , (1)
where  is the average number of photons in a pulse (i.e.,  is the MPN) and  represents the 
number of photons in the pulse (i.e., = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , N). For example, with a typical MPN, = 0.5, 
nearly 60% f t e pul es ave zero photons, 0% of the puls s have one photon, and 9% of the pulses 
have two or more photons. T s mea s nearly 23% of the non-empty pulses emitted by Alice are  
no -ideal ulti t  pulses which leak inf rmation about the “unconditionally secure”  
QKD-generated secret key to eavesdroppers. This introduces a significant security vulnerability into 
the QKD protocol. 
2.3. Photon Number Splitting (PNS) Attacks 
). Once Alice rand ly prepares
the photons, they are sent to Bob where he measures each photon using a randomly selected basis
(⊕ or ⊗). If Alice’s encoding and Bob’s decoding bases match, the photon’s bit value is read correctly
with a high probability. Otherwise, a random result occurs (i.e., equal likelihood of a 0 or 1); this
is due to the inherent uncertainty in the measurement of an unknown (i.e., a randomly encoded)
single photon. Typically, these random results are “sifted” from Bob’s recorded detections and do not
contribute to the shared key string.
Table 1. Example BB84 Protocol.
Alice Prepares Bob Measures
Bit Basis Prepared State Basis Result
0 ⊕ |↔〉 ⊕ 0
1 ⊕ |l〉 ⊕ 1
0 ⊕ |↔〉 ⊗ random
1 ⊕ |l〉 ⊗ random
0 ⊗ |
Appl. Sci. 2017, 7, 212  3 of 20 
value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair ↔, ↕ or  for the pair ⤢,⤡). Once Alice rando ly prepares 
the ph tons, they are sent to Bob where he measures each ph ton using a randomly selected basis 
(⊕  or ⊗). If Alice’s e coding and Bob’s decoding bases match, the photon’s bit value is read 
correctly with a high probability. Otherwise, a random result occurs (i.e., equal likelihood of a 0  
or 1); this is due to the inherent uncertainty in the measurement of an unknown (i.e., a ran omly 
encoded) single photon. Typically, these random results are “sifted” fr m Bob’s rec rded etecti ns 
and do not contribute to the shared key string. 
Table 1. Example BB84 Pr t ol. 
Alice Prepares Bob Measures
Bit Basis Prep r  tate Basis Result
0 ⊕ | ⊕ 0 
1 ⊕ |↕ ⊕ 1 
0 ⊕ |  ⊗ random 
1 ⊕ ↕ ⊗ random 
0 ⊗ ⤢  ⊕ random 
1 ⊗ |⤡ ⊕ random 
0 ⊗ |⤢ ⊗ 0 
1 ⊗ |⤡  ⊗ 1 
More specifically, the security of BB84 is based on the uncertainty principle where the 
measurement result is random when using two conjugate bases (i.e., ⊕ or ⊗) to prepare single 
photons [17]. For example, during an intercept-resend attack anyone attempting to listen on the 
quantum channel must randomly select a measurement basis and will necessarily introduce 
detectable errors. These unavoidable errors increase the protocol’s measured Quantum Bit Error Rate 
(QBER)—the ratio (or percent) of errors detected with respect to the total number of matched pulse 
detections—and if the QBER ever exceeds the protocol’s security threshold (e.g., QBER > 11% [4]), 
the secret key distribution process is abort d (or res arted) as it is assumed an eavesdropper is active 
on the quantum channel. T is is ecause all errors n the quantum channel are ttributed to 
adversarial interference.
2.2. Vulnerabilities in Prot c l I lem ntation
BB84 security proofs assume several idealities, including perfect on-demand single photon 
sources, lossless quantum transmission, perfect transmitter-receiver basis alignment, and perfect 
single photon detection [18]. However, these security assumptions are not valid when building  
real-world systems which deviate from theoretical protocols [2]. For example, reliable on-demand 
single photon sources are not currently available nor are they expected in the near term [1]. Therefore, 
most QKD systems attenuate classical laser pulses down from millions of photons to weak coherent 
pulses with an average photon number less than one. More specifically, the number of photons 
contained in the pulse is represented using a Poisson distribution with a low (i.e., <1) Mean Photon 
Number (MPN) | = ! , (1)
where  is the average number of photons in a pulse (i.e.,  is the MPN) and  represents the 
number of photons in the pulse (i.e., = 0, 1, 2, 3, … , N). For example, with a typical MPN, = 0.5, 
nearly 60% of the pulses have zero photons, 30% of the pulses have one photon, and 9% of the pulses 
have two or more photons. This means nearly 23% of the non-empty pulses emitted by Alice are  
non-ideal multiphoton pulses which leak information about the “unconditionally secure”  
QKD-generated secret key to eavesdroppers. This introduces a significant security vulnerability into 
the QKD protocol. 
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value (0 or 1) and basis (⊕ for the pair ↔, ↕ or ⊗ for the pair ⤢,⤡). Once Alice randomly prepares 
the photons, they are sent to Bob where he measures each photon using a randomly selected basis 
(⊕  or ⊗). If Alice’s encoding and Bob’s decoding base  match, the photon’s bit value is read 
correctly with a high probab l ty. Otherwise, a rand m result occurs (i.e., equal likel h od of a 0  
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More specifically, the security of BB84 is based on the uncertainty principle wher the
measurement result is random when using two conjugate bases (i.e., ⊕ or ⊗) to prepare single
phot ns [17]. For example, during an intercept-resend attack anyone attempting to listen on the
quantum channel must randomly select a measurement basis and will necessarily introduce detectable
errors. These unavoidable errors increase the protocol’s measured Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)—the
ratio (or percent) of errors detected with respect to the total number of matched pulse detections—and
if the QBER ever exceeds the protocol’s security threshold (e.g., QBER > 11% [4]), the secret key
distribution process is aborted ( r restarted) as it is assumed an eavesdropper is acti e on the quantum
cha nel. This is because all errors on the q antum channel are attributed to adversarial interference.
2.2. Vul erabilities in Protocol Impleme tati n
BB84 security proofs assume several idealities, including perfect on-demand single photon sources,
lossless quantum transmission, perfect transmitter-rec iver basis alignment, a d perfect single phot n
detection [18]. However, these security assumptions are not valid when building real-world systems
which deviate from theoretical protocols [2]. For example, reliable on-demand single photo so rces
are not currently available nor are hey expected in the near term [1]. Th refore, most QKD systems
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where µ is the average number of photons in a pulse (i.e., µ is the MPN) and n represents the number
of p otons in the pulse (i. ., n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , N). For example, with a typical MPN, µ = 0.5, nearly
60% of the pulses have zero hotons, 30% of the pulses have one photon, and 9% of the pulses have
two o more photons. This means nearly 23% of the non-empty puls s emitted by Alice are non-ideal
multiphot n pulses which leak infor ation about the “unconditi ally secure” QKD-generated secret
key to eavesdroppers. This introduces a significant security vulnerabili y into the QKD protocol.
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2.3. Photon Number Splitting (PNS) Attacks
The PNS attack is a powerful attack designed to take advantage of the multiphoton vulnerability
in order to obtain a full copy of Alice and Bob’s shared secret key bits without introducing errors and
thus increasing the QBER [19,20]. A brief introduction to the PNS attack is given here, with a detailed,
yet easily understandable engineering-oriented explanation available in [9].
Figure 2 provides a simplified depiction of the eavesdropper “Eve” conducting a PNS attack
against the QKD system (i.e., Alice and Bob). In accordance with QKD security proofs, Eve is an
all-powerful adversary limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics [4]. She is allowed full control
of the quantum channel to introduce losses or errors and may eavesdrop on, but not fabricate, messages
exchanged on the classical channel. In order to conduct the PNS attack, Eve replaces the quantum
channel with a quantum teleportation channel which enables the lossless transmission of photons from
Alice to Bob using the properties of entangled quantum systems [21]. An Eve′ entity is also required in
close proximity to Bob to regulate the lossless transmission of photons as to not exceed Bob’s expected
detection rate; thus, avoiding obvious detection.
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For each pulse Alice generates, Eve performs a specialized Quantum Non-Demolition (QND)
measurement to determine the number of photons in each pulse n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , N [22]. If n ≤ 1,
Eve blocks the pulse and sends nothing to Bob. If n ≥ 2, Eve splits one photon from the pulse and
stores it in her quantum memory. She then quantum teleports the remaining n − 1 photons to Bob.
This attack scheme allows Eve to store an identical encoded copy of each photon sent to Bob without
introducing additional errors (which are typically used for detecting eavesdroppers). Once Alice and
Bob complete their quantum exchange, they must announce measurement basis information over
the classical channel where Eve is able to listen. Eve can then correctly measure each stored photon,
and thus, obtain a complete copy of the QKD-generated “secure” key bits.
2.4. The Decoy State Protocol
In 2003, the decoy state protocol was introduced to detect PNS attacks [23]. It was quickly
improved upon in a series of works [24–28]; and is now widely employed in commercially viable
QKD systems such as Toshiba’s record holding system [29] and the world’s largest QKD network [30].
In particular, the decoy state protocol is advantageous as it is relatively easy to implement (low
cost), increases the system’s distributed secret key rate (high performance), and mitigates the PNS
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attack (improves implementation security). Note, while the decoy state protocol is designed to detect
PNS attacks, other QKD protocols are not vulnerable to the attack (e.g., Continuous Variable or
Measurement-Device Independent [1]); however, despite recent advances of alternative protocols,
the decoy state protocol continues to be the most cost effective and practical to implement.
As described by Ma et al., the decoy state protocol extends the BB84 protocol by configuring
Alice to randomly transmit three types of pulses: (1) Signal; (2) Decoy; and (3) Vacuum, as described
in Table 2 [25]. Thus, Alice randomly generates signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses according to
their prescribed occurrence percentages and respective MPNs where the state of each pulse must
be indistinguishable to Eve (i.e., identical pulse shape, wavelength, duration, etc.) in order to
maintain integrity of the security protocol. Eve cannot know a priori the type of pulse received
during quantum exchange, the only information available to her is each pulse’s specific number of
photons n = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , N which she determines using her QND measurement.
Table 2. Example Decoy State Protocol Configuration.
State Purpose MPN OccurrencePercentage
Signal µ
The signal state is used to generate secret key and facilitates
improved performance by using a higher MPN (i.e., 0.5 is
greater than the value 0.1 typically employed in non-decoy
state protocol QKD systems).
0.5 70%
Decoy ν
The decoy state is used to increase the likelihood of detecting
unauthorized eavesdropping on the quantum channel
through statistical differential analysis with the signal state.
0.1 20%
Vacuum Y0
The vacuum state is used to determine the noise on the
quantum channel known as the “dark count” (i.e., detections
when no photons are sent).
0.0 10%
2.5. Unconditionally Secure Key Generation
While the decoy state protocol was introduced to detect PNS attacks, to date it has been primarily
used to increase unconditionally secure key rates. More specifically, decoy state research has focused
on understanding and bounding Alice’s single photon generation rate, Q1, as it pertains to the secret
key generation rate R [25].
R ≥ q{Q1[1 − H2(e1)]− Qµ f (Eµ)H2(Eµ)}, (2)
where q is the protocol efficiency (e.g., <1), Q1 is the estimated single photon contribution, e1 is the





is the error reconciliation efficiency, and H2({Eµ, e1}) is Shannon’s binary information
function [15]. In a general sense, the positive contribution of Equation (2) accounts for pulses emitted
by Alice containing a single photon (i.e., Q1)—those which can contribute to the QKD-generated
“unconditionally secure” key rate R, while the negative contribution accounts for insecure multi-photon
pulses and errors which are also consider insecure contributions [25]. More specifically, the parameters
of Equation (2) are described in Table 3. For a more detailed, yet readily accessible discussion of these
parameters, please see [7]. For more comprehensive treatments, please see the references listed below.
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Table 3. Secure Key Rate Parameters [7].
Parameter Description
q
The protocol efficiency represents the overall efficiency of the QKD protocol (e.g., q < 1).
For example, in the classical BB84 protocol shown in Table 1, 50% of the detections will be sifted
out because of Bob’s random choice of basis measurement.
Q1
The estimated gain of pulses emitted by Alice with one photon (i.e., the single photons prepared
by Alice and successfully measured by Bob). This value is typically calculated (or bounded) by
several operational parameters such as, ν, Qµ, and Y0.
e1
The estimated error rate associated with pulses emitted by Alice with a single photon. This value
is typically calculated (or bounded) by several operational parameters such as, ν, Eµ, Qµ and Y0.
Qµ
The gain of the signal state is calculated from system measurements, where
Qµ =
Number o f signal state detections
Total number o f sent signal state pulses
Eµ
The QBER of the signal state is calculated from system measurements, where
Eµ =
Number o f signal state bit errors




) The error reconciliation efficiency is dependent upon the signal state QBER Eµ with typical





Uncertainty in the error rate e1 or Eµ is calculated using Shannon’s binary entropy limit [15].
In their 2005 work, Ma et al. optimized the single photon generate rate Q1 while simultaneously
bounding the error rates e1 and Eµ to maximize the secure key rate R [25]. More specifically to the decoy
state protocol configuration, this optimization results in recommend signal and decoy state MPNs of
µ ∼= 0.5 and ν ∼= 0.1 because of implementation limitations in classical laser sources (as described in
Section 2.2) [25]. Following this seminal work, many others have studied this optimization problem to
more fully understand and bound the single photon estimate Q1, the negative impact of associated error
rates e1 and Eµ, and expected fluctuations in commercially available laser sources [31–40]. Additionally,
considerations for finite key size statistics (i.e., limitations due to the number of detections) have been
carefully investigated by others [28,41–43]. Here, we also note a recent work that benchmarks secret key
rates over ideal quantum communication channels to include the decoy state protocol [44]. In addition
to these works, several practically-oriented experimental demonstrations have been accomplished as
detailed in Table 4 (discussed in Section 3).
2.6. Detecting PNS Attacks
The decoy state protocol is designed to detect PNS attacks by comparing the signal and decoy
states during quantum exchange, and specifically, the photon number dependent yields of the signal
state Ysignaln , the decoy state Y
decoy
n , and the expected yield Y
expected







where Yn represents the conditional probability that Bob detects a pulse given Alice sent an n-photon
pulse. Ideally, Ysignaln and Y
decoy
n are measured, while Y
expected
n is calculated (or estimated) from a known
quantum channel efficiency η.
Yexpectedn = Y0 + ηn −Y0ηn ≈ Y0 + ηn (4)
where Y0 is the measured dark count rate and ηn = 1− (1− η)n is the photon number specific efficiency
based on the number of photons, n, in each pulse and the measured quantum efficiency η. Note,
the joint probability Y0ηn is typically disregarded because it is insignificant compared to Y0 and ηn.
As indicated by Equation (3), under normal operational conditions (i.e., when no PNS attacks
are occurring), the signal and decoy state yields should be the same as the expected photon number




1 . This security condition should always be
true for a decoy state enabled QKD architecture because the signal and decoy state yields are primarily
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it is not considered in this work since the PNS attack does not introduce errors [19].
3. Research Methodology
Table 4 provides a comprehensive listing of practically-oriented decoy state enabled systems and
experiments. With respect to signal and decoy state MPNs, there is relatively little consistency or
adherence to Ma and coworkers’ 2005 work where they proved the optimal signal state MPN ∼= 0.5
and decoy state MPN ∼= 0.1 [25]. Similarly, there is considerable disparity in the protocol occurrence
percentages with signal states ranging from 50% to ~99%, decoy states ranging from <1% to 40%,
and vacuum states ranging from 0% to 25%. Note, while these experimental MPN parameters differ
from those proposed by Ma et al., such discrepancies do not indicate that the Ma et al. security model
is inappropriate. Furthermore, such differences may be due to differences in system architectures such
as end-to-end losses (e.g., channel loss, insertion loss, detection efficiencies, etc.), security bounds,
and post-processing techniques.
Despite the decoy state protocol’s wide-spread employment, its effectiveness in detecting PNS
attacks has not been thoroughly addressed in the literature. For example, in his defining work on the
decoy state protocol, Lo states “Any attack by Eve that will change the value of any one of the Yn’s and
en’s substantially will, in principle, be caught with high probability by our decoy state method” [24].
Likewise, in the most detailed treatment available on detecting PNS attacks, the author merely states
“significant deviation of the measured ratio from this expected value indicates a PNS by Eve” [45].
Thus, we desire to study the decoy state QKD system’s ability to detect PNS attacks through model
and simulation.
Table 4. Decoy State Enabled QKD System Configurations.
Case Signal MPN Decoy MPN OccurrencePercentage (µ/ν/Y0)
Propagation
Distance (km) Key Rate (bps)
1 [46] 0.80 0.12 90/10/0 15 165
2 [47] 0.55 0.152 63.5/20.3/16.2 60 <428 *
3 [5] 0.425 0.204 75/25/0 * 25 5.5 k
4 [48] 0.6 0.2 50/40/10 75 ~12
5 [48] 0.6 0.2 50/40/10 102 ~8
6 [49] 0.487 0.064 83.1/12.3/4.6 85 ~28
7 [49] 0.297 0.099 83.1/12.3/4.6 100 ~2
8 [50] 0.27 0.39 87/9/4 144 ~13
9 [51] 0.55 0.098 93/6.2/1.6 ** 20 10 k
10 [52] 0.48 0.16 93/6.2/1.6 ** 25 5.7 k
11 [53] 0.55 0.10 80/16/4 20 1.02 M
12 [54] 0.57 0.13 70/20/10 140 ~2
13 [55] 0.65 0.08 75/12.5/12.5 20 1.5 k
14 [55] 0.60 0.20 75/12.5/12.5 20 1.6 k
15 [55] 0.6 0.2 50/25/25 200 11.8
16 [56] 0.6 0.2 50/25/25 200 15
17 [57] 0.5 0.1 98.83/0.78/0.39 50 1.002 M
18 [58] 0.6 0.2 75/12.5/12.5 8–60 *** 1.2–4.5 k ***
19 [30] 0.65 0.1 87.5/6.25/6.25 30–80 *** 0.8–16 k ***
20 [29] 0.4 0.04 98/1.5/0.5 45 300 k
* Value estimated or assumed from reference; ** Values as reported; *** Multiple systems employed.
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3.1. Problem Formulation and Research Questions
As the decoy state protocol is often employed in high performance QKD systems, and particularly
the most impressive technology demonstrations to date (in terms of delivered key rate [29] and network
size [30]), there is a need to understand the protocol’s ability to detect PNS attacks more fully. Moreover,
it is important for system developers and users to understand how the protocol can be optimized
to maximize both quantum throughput for secret key generation and detect PNS attacks with high
confidence. Therefore, it is desirable to address the following research questions:
(1) How do the signal and decoy state MPN values affect the system’s ability to detect PNS attacks?
(2) How does the difference between the signal and decoy state MPN values affect the system’s
ability to detect PNS attacks?
(3) How do the signal, decoy, and vacuum state occurrence percentages affect the system’s ability to
detect PNS attacks?
(4) How does variation in the generation and detection of signal and decoy states affect the system’s
ability to detect PNS attacks?
(5) How does propagation distance (i.e., loss) affect the system’s ability to differentiate between
normal behavior and physical disturbances indicative of PNS attacks?
3.2. Experimental Design
From the comprehensive listing of decoy state configurations captured in Table 4, and detailed
understanding of the decoy state protocol, five experimental factors are identified as shown in Table 5.
First, operational distances of 20 and 50 km are selected to represent common metropolitan network
lengths and long-haul backbone links. For those not familiar with quantum communication, losses of
~0.2 dB per km in single mode fiber significantly limit propagation distances where 20 km equates to
4 dB loss (or 40% efficiency) and 50 km equates to 10 dB loss (or 10% efficiency) [1]. Next, signal and
decoy MPNs representative of normal and high configurations are chosen for examination, 0.5 and 0.8
respectively. As the main focus of this study, five occurrence percentage configurations are selected
for analysis. Lastly, each treatment is examined during normal conditions and when subject to PNS
attacks in order to baseline the QKD system’s performance and ability to detect PNS attacks. Note,
the decoy state protocol does not prevent the attack, it merely detects it.
Table 5. Experimental Design.
Operational Distance Signal MPN Decoy MPN Occurrence Percentage(Signal/Decoy/Vacuum) PNS Attack
20 km 0.5 0.1 60/30/10 No
50 km 0.8 0.2 70/20/10 Yes
— — — 80/10/10 —
— — — 90/5/5 —
— — — 99/0.5/0.5 —
All other design and configuration settings are held constant (described in Section 3.3).
For this study, a full factorial design was selected, as it is relatively easy to simulate all
80 treatments once the experimental factors are well understood. In order to characterize the modeled
system’s behavior well across all 80 configurations and make statistically significant conclusions,
1000 simulation runs were executed for each treatment using the DoD’s High Performance Computing
Modernization Program at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. In particular, the model was packaged as
a single executable application with a series of command line parameters, to account for the design
of Table 5, and executed in parallel over 1024 cores for a total of 80,000 simulation runs for a total of
nearly 200,000 h of processor time.
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Regarding this experimental design, it is important to note that 20 km does not necessarily provide
a sufficient loss budget for Eve to conduct PNS attacks without negatively impacting Bob’s expected
detection rate [59]. This is because Eve introduces loss on the quantum channel as she blocks all the
single photon pulses sent by Alice. For example, Eve introduces ~7.4 dB loss against an MPN of 0.5,
whereas the 20 km link only provides a ~4 dB loss budget for Eve to take advantage of with her lossless
quantum teleportation channel. Despite this constraint, analyzing the decoy state protocol’s ability
to detect PNS attacks at this distance is desirable because many implementations have operational
distances of 15–25 km as noted in Table 4. Moreover, if Eve is able to insert herself on the quantum
channel before protocol calibration, her presence would go unnoticed with respect to loss and key rate.
3.3. Research Model
The research model (i.e., Alice, Bob, Eve, communication channels, and their supporting optical
components) is described in detail in [6,7,9]; thus, this section merely provides an overview of
the model and its most important configuration parameters. The research model was developed
in a discrete event simulation framework specifically designed to study the impact of security
and performance implementation non-idealities in QKD systems, algorithms, and protocols [6].
For example, performance and security limitations with respect to speed, accuracy, and environmental
disturbances are captured in Alice’s modeled laser source, decoy state generator, pulse modulator,
quantum channel, and Avalanche Photo-Diode (APD) detectors. The decoy state enabled BB84 QKD
model was developed in three increments each with increasing capability. The first increment provided
a hardware-focused QKD notional architecture built in a modular fashion from a library of optical and
electro-optical components with probabilistic weak coherent optical pulses [6]. The second increment
added the processes and logic required to execute the decoy state protocol [7,60]. In the third increment,
the behaviors of several modeled components were extended to properly handle the propagation of
photon number specific representations of optical pulses (i.e., Fock states) and the PNS attack was
fully implemented [9]. Throughout model development, considerable effort was spent thoroughly
defining, decomposing, modeling, verifying, and validating the decoy state enabled QKD model
with each optical component verified against commercial specifications (see Appendix of [6,61]).
Additionally, the model was validated against eight fielded QKD systems [7] with additional modeling
and simulation details presented in Section 4.
In this study, Alice is configured to generate signal, decoy, and vacuum pulses according to
the decoy state protocol and BB84 polarization based prepare and measure modulation scheme
as described in Section 2. In particular, Alice is programmed to randomly prepare signal, decoy,
and vacuum pulses according to the user’s prescribed occurrence percentages at a 5 MHz pulse rate
with commercially representative laser fluctuations (see Section 4.2 for details). Alice then transmits
the prepared pulses through the appropriate 20 or 50 km quantum channel, which has 4 or 10 dB loss
respectively with induced physical disturbances which may cause the pulse’s polarization to change
over time. In accordance with the polarization based prepare and measure scheme, Bob’s model
includes beam splitters, polarizing beam splitters, a bandpass filter for a total of 3.5 dB loss. Most
importantly, Bob contains models of commercially available APD detectors each configured with 10%
detector efficiency, a 5 × 10−6 dark count rate (spontaneous detections when no photons are present),
and a 0.01 after pulse rate (erroneous detections following a successful detection).
The research model allows users and developers to more easily (and collectively) study
performance and security considerations of the decoy state protocol configurations as presented
in Table 4 than when compared to building hardware implementations. Additionally, the model allows
security analysts to uniquely study the security profile of decoy state enabled QKD systems in ways
that are difficult or impossible with conventional means. For example, the model enables detailed
analysis of the PNS attack using a hardware-focused representation—something that cannot yet be
fully realized with current technologies [19,20]. In this way, the model allows for detailed traceability
of each multiphoton pulse generated by Alice, split by Eve, and detected by Bob. Thus, the security
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analyst is able to explicitly know which weak optical pulses are compromised yet contribute to the
QKD-generated secret key bits.
4. Analysis of Results
In this section, the decoy state protocol’s ability to detect PNS attacks is examined. First,
the efficiency based method of detecting PNS attacks is explained, including expected operational
variations from non-ideal optical components and processes. Next, simulation results for several
common decoy state protocol configurations are described. Based on these results, an optimization of
the decoy state protocol is presented and demonstrated. Lastly, implementation security guidance is
offered for decoy state enabled QKD systems.
4.1. Detecting PNS Attacks
Despite the creativeness of Eve’s PNS attack, her detectability is based on the decoy state protocol’s
ability to differentiate between subtle changes in the signal and decoy states. In lieu of comparing




n which can be statically bounded or directly
measurable using expensive Photon Number Resolving (PNR) detectors [62], this work utilizes the
efficiency based security condition which provides a direct measurement in a cost-conscience QKD
system implementation [8].
ηsignal = ηdecoy (5)
where ηsignal is the signal state efficiency and ηdecoy is the decoy state efficiency. The efficiency based
decoy state security method directly compares the signal and decoy state efficiencies from readily
available measurements instead of requiring advanced technologies. The signal (and decoy) state
efficiency is defined as
ηsignal =
− ln
∣∣1 + Y0 −Qµ∣∣
µ
(6)
where Y0 is the system’s measured dark count rate defined as
Y0 =
Number of vacuum state detections
Number of vacuum state pulses sent
(7)
and Qµ is the measured signal state gain defined as
Qµ =
Number of signal state detections
Number of signal state pulses sent
(8)
and µ is the signal state’s prescribed MPN (typically 0.5). This method also allows the QKD system
to assure the quantum channel is free from unwanted attacks without a priori knowledge such as a
well-characterized quantum channel as required in prior art.
4.2. Expected Variation in the Decoy State Protocol
Due to non-ideal devices, physical disturbances, and probabilistic single photon sources,
variations are expected in the protocol’s operation. These variations directly impact the system’s
ability to detect PNS attacks and must be accounted for, thus, the security condition becomes
ηsignal = ηdecoy ± ∆ (9)
where ∆ represents the protocol’s expected variation during quantum exchange. Variation in the decoy
state efficiency is primarily considered because it exhibits significantly more variation than the signal
state due to its reduced occurrence percentage and lower MPN.
While there are many potential sources of variation (e.g., fluctuations in laser sources, polarization
dependent losses, variations in decoy state MPNs, temperature changes, physical disturbances,
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unstable detector efficiencies, etc.), many of them can be ignored due to the rapid propagation of
photons through optical fiber (i.e., 2/3 the speed of light ≈2 × 108 m/s). More explicitly, quantum
exchange rounds (i.e., 100,000 signal state detections [63]) are typically very short (e.g., <20 × 10−3 s)
and many of these effects are orders of magnitude slower (e.g., temperature change due to direct
sunlight). Thus, Alice’s pulse-to-pulse variation is of primary interest, and specifically, variation in
her laser source (e.g., a commercially available id300 pulsed laser [64]) and decoy state generator
(e.g., an electronically controlled Variable Optical Attenuator (VOA) used to control the MPN of each
signal, decoy, and vacuum pulse [65]).
Figure 3 illustrates Alice’s modeled variation when calibrated to produce weak coherent optical
pulses with an MPN of 0.55. Because of the large number of pulses, the 99.9% Prediction Interval
(PI) characterizes her expected MPN variation well. This means Alice will generate pulses with an
MPN between 0.49 and 0.61 nearly 100% of the time. Thus, variations in generating signal, decoy,
and vacuum pulses should be expected and addressed when considering the effectiveness of the decoy
state protocol in detecting PNS attacks.Appl. Sci. 2017, 7, 212  11 of 20 
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blocked since the higher MPN generates more multi-photon pulses. Thus, Eve significantly reduces
the decoy state efficiency. This behavior is precisely why the decoy state protocol requires two different
MPNs in otherwise indistinguishable states (i.e., Eve is unaware of the pulse type she is acting upon,
since any of the pulses (signal, decoy, or vacuum) could consist of 0, 1, or ≥2 photons). Additionally,
as can be seen in the downward trending efficiencies, these responses are tempered by the protocol’s
occurrence percentages and Eve’s gain matching.
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In the 40 configurations considered at both 20 and 50 km distances, the PNS attack was successfully
detected in all 40,000 trials (i.e., 1000 trials in each of the 40 PNS attack configurations simulated).
For example, in the worst case scenario, when the signal and decoy state MPNs are closest (0.5 and 0.2)
with the least amount of decoy states (99% signal, 0.5% decoy, and 0.5% vacuum) and the most loss
(10 dB loss over the 50 km channel), there is very strong statistical evidence that the PNS attack will
be detected because ηsignal 6= ηdecoy ± ∆. More specifically, based on 1000 simulations in the worst
case configuration, the decoy state enabled QKD system has less than one in a thousand chance of
not detecting the attack with a low probability of p < 0.001. These results demonstrate the decoy state
protocol’s ability to detect PNS attacks across a wide set of commonly implemented configurations
to include when the decoy state intensity is very weak and the occurrence percentage is very small.
Moreover, these results illustrate that the protocol can be further optimized with respect to the signal
and decoy state occurrence percentages to maximize quantum throughout on the signal state as
identified by the large “white space” between the signal and decoy states efficiencies in Figure 5 for
even the most stringent configurations (when the occurrence percentages are: 99% signal, 0.5% decoy,
and 0.5% vacuum).
4.4. Optimization for Performance and Security
While the decoy state protocol has been optimized with respect to MPNs contributing to secret
key distribution [25], the signal and decoy state occurrence percentages have not been optimized for
maximizing quantum throughout while simultaneously detecting PNS attacks with high confidence.
Hence, we provide an optimization which assures high security confidence and allows the protocol’s
performance to be maximized based on a detailed study of signal and decoy state MPNs and occurrence
percentages, as well as, design decisions and architectural considerations.
From this study, we learn that the protocol’s ability to detect PNS attacks is primarily controlled by
losses due to each state’s occurrence percentage, MPN, and the end-to-end quantum communication
path. More specifically, to detect PNS attacks in real-time with high confidence only a few decoy
state detections are necessary during each round of quantum exchange (i.e., a predetermined number
of detections). For example, the decoy state protocol can be configured to perform the PNS attack
check after each round of 100,000 detections. Furthermore, we learn that an arbitrarily high level of
confidence (e.g., >99.9%) is possible because statistical confidence is increased through multiple rounds
of quantum exchange and not the number of decoy state detections per round. Note this optimization
is meant to maximize quantum throughput and requires that other secret key rate estimations such as
Q1 and e1 for Equation (2) be derived from dedicated, periodic calibration runs.
In order to optimize the decoy state protocol, the developer should choose the highest signal
state occurrence percentage possible, while meeting the minimum number of decoy state detections to
reliably detect PNS attacks (i.e., choose the minimal decoy occurrence percentage possible). Assuming
the suggested MPNs of Ma et al. are used (µ = 0.5, ν = 0.1) [25], the optimized decoy state protocol
configuration can be described in a system of equations. First, the signal state occurrence percentage
Sµ should be as a close to unity as possible
Sµ → 1 (10)
where Sµ is limited by the decoy and vacuum state occurrence percentages Sν, SY0 , respectively
Sµ = 1− Sν − SY0 . (11)
Accordingly, it is advantageous to minimize both Sν and SY0 ; however, the decoy state occurrence
percentage Sν must be high enough to effectively differentiate between noise on the quantum channel
and a PNS attack where the decoy state gain Qν must exceed the system’s measured dark count rate Y0.
Qν > Y0. (12)
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This condition implies at least one decoy state detection Nν per round of quantum exchange
which is not due to a dark count (i.e., a signal to noise ratio >1).
Thus, the optimized decoy state configuration can be further clarified
Sν  1 (13)
Nν ≥ 1. (14)
For a given architecture, the optimized decoy state protocol can be determined from the minimum
number of decoy state detections Nν, the desired number of signal state detections Nµ, the signal and
decoy state gains Qµ, Qν, and their occurrence percentages Sµ, Sν where
Nν = SνQνNtotal pulses sent (15)








While the necessary parameters for optimization are readily available, in order maximize
performance the system’s architecture must be well-characterized in the desired operational
environment. This is because the decoy state protocol is being configured to operate at its minimum
threshold and is extremely sensitive to implementation non-idealities and performance variations
to include Alice’s ability to generate weak coherent pulses, losses in the quantum channel, physical
disturbances, detector efficiency, and particularly the system’s operational dark count rate.
4.5. Example Optimization
In this section, an optimization of a fielded decoy state enabled QKD system is demonstrated. As
one of the most well documented decoy state protocol implementations and a major milestone in the
world’s largest QKD network, Chen and coworkers’ work lends itself well to detailed analysis [55].
The protocol’s configuration is provided in Table 6.
Table 6. Example Decoy State Protocol Configuration.
Protocol Configuration Operational Results
Sµ = 0.75 η = 0.00985
Sν = 0.125 Qµ = 6.36 × 10−3
SY0 = 0.125 Qν = 8.61× 10−4
µ = 0.65 Y0 = 1.0 × 10−4
ν = 0.08 —
Assuming Nµ = 100, 000 detections per quantum exchange and an arbitrarily small vacuum state
occurrence percentage SY0 = 0.005, the decoy state protocol occurrence percentages can be optimized
to Sµ = 0.99435, Sν = 0.00065 using the approach described in Equations (9)–(16). This optimized
configuration is particularly advantageous as it results in a >30% increase in key rate (i.e., a signal
state occurrence percentage 99.435% instead of 75%) and the ability to detect PNS attack with 99.9%
confidence at no additional cost. This optimization accounts for expected real-world variations in the
source but does not account for significant disturbances in the quantum channel which would quickly
eliminate the ability to reliably perform QKD regardless of the decoy state configuration.
Figure 6 presents detailed results of the optimized protocol while operating under normal
conditions and when subject to PNS attacks. Shown on the left, during normal operations the signal
and decoy state efficiencies (blue and red) overlap as expected. Shown in the middle, PNS attacks cause
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the signal and decoy state efficiencies (green and purple) to become non-overlapping. In particular,
since the protocol is configured to operate with a minimum number of decoy state detections, the PNS
attack reduces the decoy state from a small number of detections to zero during nearly every round
of quantum exchange. This results in a reported decoy state mean efficiency of 0.000 with relatively
little variation (see Figure 7 for further details). Consequently, the optimized decoy state protocol
configuration serves to emphasize the negative impact of the PNS attack by forcing the decoy state’s
efficiency below the measured dark count rate (shown in brown with a detailed inlay) because so few
decoy state detections are expected per round of quantum exchange.
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Figure 7 displays the number of decoy state detections per round of quantum exchange during
normal operations (shown in green) and when subject to PNS attacks (shown in red). During normal
operations, the optimized configuration results, shown in green, demonstrate at least one decoy state
detection per 100,000 detections and a mean of nine detections. Conversely, as shown in red, very
few decoy state detections are expected during PNS attacks. Detections occur in only 134 out of the
1000 rounds of quantum exchange, which constitute statistical outliers. In terms of efficiency, the mean
decoy state efficiency is 0.0096 during normal operations (shown in red in Figure 6) and drops to 0.0013
(shown in purple in Figure 6) during PNS attacks. As a result, the PNS attack is readily detectable with
a high statistical confidence of (i.e., >99.9% or p < 0.001) when considering 1000 rounds of quantum
exchange with a total of 100,000 detections per round.
While the decoy state occurrence percentage Sν can be further reduced, statistical significance
begins to diminish because the number of decoy state detections per round of quantum exchange
approaches zero during normal operations. Moreover, as the occurrence percentage is further reduced
the protocol’s integrity is jeopardized as the decoy state gain must be larger than the system’s dark
count rate (i.e., Qν > Y0).
4.6. Implementation Recommendations
In addition to the protocol optimization described above, this research effort brought to our
attention several design and implementation recommendations for commercially viable QKD systems.
While these recommendations are not entirely new or novel, they are important to highlight for QKD
performance, implementation security, and potentially formal certification efforts.
(1) Upon system startup, the decoy state protocol should be configured to quickly perform initial
security checks to ensure the quantum channel is free from PNS attacks. For example, 1000 rounds
of quantum exchange can be executed in a relatively short amount of time during initial
calibration activities.
(2) Configure the decoy state protocol to continuously monitor for PNS attacks in real-time and over
several rounds of quantum exchange to increase confidence in the system’s security.
(3) The noise level (i.e., the dark count rate) should be measured during dedicated calibration
activities with very large numbers of vacuum signals (e.g., ≥109) intermixed with signal and
decoy states to well-characterize the operational environment and system architecture.
(4) During operation, the dark count rate should be compared to the calibration results in order
to detect changes in the operational environment such as temperature changes or additional
physical disturbances.
(5) Minimize the vacuum state occurrence percentage but do not eliminate it. The state can be used
as an indicator to monitor for attacks such as the blinding attack [66].
Additionally, while Ma and coworkers’ work optimized the signal state MPN at ~0.5, users may
want to consider higher signal state MPNs such as those successfully demonstrated in the world’s
largest QKD network (i.e., µ = 0.65) [30]. Moreover, past work on the subject recommends MPNs on
the order of 1.0–1.2 based on pragmatic technical assumptions [67].
5. Conclusions
In this study, the ability of the decoy state enabled QKD systems to detect PNS attacks is analyzed
and demonstrated. In contrast to most decoy state protocol research which focus on decoy state
security bounds and estimates, this work focuses on the protocol’s occurrence percentages to both
maximize signal state quantum throughput and assure PNS attacks are detectable with high confidence.
Additionally, practical implementation performance and security guidance is provided for system
developers and users. Lastly, this work demonstrates a repeatable methodology for studying QKD
system implementation security to support formal certification efforts [68].
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Future suggested work includes optimization of the decoy state protocol in a fielded QKD system
along with a detailed study of how the recommended occurrence percentages should be balanced with
other constraints such as the need for bounded error rates. Additionally, in terms of validating the
proposed decoy state configuration’s ability to detect PNS attacks, a decoy state enabled QKD system
should be tested against PNS-like attacks (see [20] for an example), since it is currently impossible to
build a fully functional PNS attack. Lastly, the author recommends continued emphasis on studying
QKD implementation security issues towards formal certification of decoy state enabled systems as
they remain the most commercially viable option in the near future (especially when considering
practical issues such as distance limitations and delivered key rates).
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